Abstract. Secure processing of location data in location-based services (LBS) can be implemented with cryptographic protocols. We propose a protocol based on oblivious transfer and homomorphic encryption. Its properties are the avoidance of personal information on the services side, and a fair revenue distribution scheme. We discuss this in contrast to other LBS solutions that seek to anonymize information as well as possible towards the services. For this purpose, we introduce a proxy party. The proxy interacts with multiple services and collects money from subscribing users. Later on, the proxy distributes the collected payment to the services based on the number of subscriptions to each service. Neither the proxy nor the services learn the exact relation between users and the services they are subscribed to.
Introduction
Does my electronic map need to know where I am -or that I am looking at it? Electronic maps can be augmented with information provided by locationbased services (LBS). This way subscribed users can find what they need fast. With LBSs, location privacy is at stake. To reach good privacy, it is advisable to limit access to identity information and access to location information. Even the regular observation of service usage patterns might reveal private information.
Today LBSs are provided in one of two ways. Either all the service specific data is made available to the user who computes the result locally-this is the case for car navigation systems; or the service is provided remotely. The latter is the dominant approach for providing LBSs in mobile communication networks. Such LBSs can be seen as a by-product of the GSM system (Global System for Mobile Communications), as the location of subscribers is already used for mobility management [17] . Given these constraints, we aim at achieving privacy for mobile subscribers who want to use LBSs. We presume that the location will be gathered from a mobile network, while the service will be provided by external service providers.
Our approach uses cryptographic protocols to ensure privacy: Oblivious transfer and homomorphic encryption. By developing a framework where the user's location and subscription are processed in the encrypted domain, we achieve privacy for certain classes of LBSs in a new way. Unlike classic approaches using Mixes or anonymous credentials [19] , our approach achieves the following strong privacy properties: First, the mobile operator learns nothing in addition to what he already knows except for the set of users that are at all interested in using LBSs. Thus, no usage profiles can be collected. Second, the service providers only learn the number of subscribers to their service. Thus, service providers do not learn the users' location.
Our protocol offers the additional privacy property of service unobservability. Even the service providers do not know whether a user is accessing their service or not. By introducing a privacy trustee we are able to preserve service unobservability in case of service/operator collaboration.
The privacy provided is optimal: the operator needs to know the set of LBSs users such that he can localize and charge them, and services are payed by the operator depending on the number of subscribers they were able to attract.
Efficiency consideration. Despite the strong security requirements, our protocol scales well: The initialization is independent of the number of users. Subscriptions are linear both in effort and in size in the number of services. This is unavoidable, as all services need to be involved to guarantee service unobservability. The mobile user as the party with the most restricted resources has to receive and decrypt only a single message.
Related Work. Various privacy enhancing technologies (PET) have been proposed for LBSs. Most of these techniques focus on providing pseudonymity and anonymity for LBSs. Federath et al. [13] proposed the use of a trusted fixed station and Mixes [9] for hiding the relation of real world identities to location data in GSM networks. While our protocol can be adapted to such a privacy enhanced GSM network by letting the fixed station localize the user (and take over some of the responsibilities of the mobile operator), we explicitly focus on the less privacy friendly but more practical setting where a third party knows the user's location.
Researchers started to develop LBS specific PETs called mix-zones (see [5] and [16] ). Mix-zones allow users to switch pseudonyms associated to their location in an unobservable way. Kölsch et al. [19] use pseudonymization techniques in the following realistic setting. A network operator (or a party connected to multiple operators) knows the user's location, while the LBSs are provided by independent service providers that know the user only under short lived pseudonyms. Basically, as location information is inherently attached to a person's life, reidentification is often easy [15] . Location needs to be hidden, not anonymized.
Structure of the paper. Section 2 considers cryptographic tools. We describe the properties and high level implementation of our privacy protecting LBS scheme in Sec. 3. The detailed construction is given in Sec. 4. We analyze the efficiency and security of our solution in Sec. 5 and finally conclude in Sec 6.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge. A zero-knowledge proof is an interactive proof in which the verifier learns nothing besides the fact that the statement proven is true. Zero-knowledge proofs-of-knowledge protocols exist for proving various statements about discrete logarithms in groups of known and hidden order [4, 6, 8, 26] . These techniques allow to prove statements about cryptographic primitives that operate in these groups, for instance that two commitments contain the same value, or that a value was verifiably encrypted. Given a statement Alg(x) = y and Alg (x ) = y about two algorithms, with secret input x, x and public output y, y , it is possible to prove AND and OR relations of these statements. Such protocols can be made non-interactive by applying a cryptographic trick called the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [14] . We write in a short form notation, e.g., for AND
Homomorphic Encryption. Homomorphic encryption is a form of malleable encryption. Given two ciphertexts, it is possible to create a third ciphertext, with a plain text that is related to the first two. For (additive) homomorphic encryptions, the encrypted plain texts fulfill the following relations:
We speak of additive homomorphic encryption because + corresponds to the addition operation of a ring. We write c ⊗ Enc h (m) to denote the c times homomorphic addition of Enc h (m). Note that for Damgård-Jurik Encryption [12] c ⊗ Enc h (m) corresponds to Enc h (m) c and can be implemented efficiently.
Damgård-Jurik Encryption. The Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem is a generalization and adaptation of the Pallier cryptosystem [23] based on the decisional composite residuosity assumption. It allows for the encryption of arbitrary long messages without the need to generate new keys. It preserves the homomorphic property of Pallier. They also describe the zero-knowledge proofs and threshold decryption techniques required by our protocol.
Threshold encryption. In a distributed decryption protocol a private key is shared among a group of parties, where only a qualified subset of the parties is allowed to decrypt a ciphertext c, whereas fewer parties learn nothing on the secret nor on the decryption of c. In our scheme we use the special case of a distributed 3-out-of-3 threshold encryption scheme, which could be implemented, e.g., with the threshold protocol presented in [12] .
Oblivious Transfer. Oblivious transfer (OT) was first introduced by Rabin [25] . The primitive captures the notion of a protocol by which a sender sends some information to the receiver, but remains oblivious as to what is sent. Adaptive OT from Blind Signatures. For LBSs, we are not so much interested in single executions of OT, but want to query the same database multiple times at different indices (for different users and changing locations). Adaptive OT protocols were proposed in [11, 20, 21] . Camenisch et al. [7] recognized that the schemes in [11, 21] are based on a common principle to construct adaptive OT from unique blind signature schemes (UBSS). The first UBSS is described by Chaum in [10] . We briefly sketch the basic idea of adaptive OT schemes based on UBSS. First, all messages m 1 , . . . , m n are symmetrically encrypted using the hashed signature of the index i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as the key. Thus C i = Enc s (m i ; H(Sign(i; sk))). H is a symmetric hash function, Enc s is a secure symmetric cipher, Sign is the signature algorithm corresponding to the UBSS, and sk is the signing key of the sender that will be used for creating the blind signature. The ciphertexts C 1 , . . . , C n are transferred to the receiver. To obtain message mî, the receiver runs a blind signature protocol with the sender on messageî to obtain the symmetric key (signature onî).
OT using Homomorphic Encryption. It is a known property of additive homomorphic encryption that given an encryption Q = Enc h (1) it is possible to compute an encryption of a message m as m ⊗ Q = Enc h (m · 1) = Enc h (m). However, if Q = Enc h (0), the same operation does not change anything, i.e., m ⊗ Enc h (0) = Enc h (0) [22] .
Given the semantic security of the encryption, the party trying to encode the message cannot distinguish the two cases above. Based on this observation an OT can be constructed by using a vector Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q ). To request message m, Q = Enc h (1) and Q j = Enc h (0) for j =. Zero-knowledge proofs can be used to prove the correct construction of Q. The communication complexity of the protocol can be reduced by computing E = j=1 m j ⊗ Q j , and transferring only E to the recipient.
3 Privacy Protected LBS Scheme: Security Definition and Solution Sketch
Definition
Parties. Our protocol involves a user U who accesses LBSs over her mobile device. Her goal is to obtain location specific information on topics of her interest. This information is collected and served by service providers L 1 , . . . , L . A third party that knows the user's location and stands in a financial relationship with the user acts as a proxy P between users and services -this could be the mobile operator of the user or an organization associated with it. The proxy is responsible for the security of the location information and assists in the payment transaction. We assume that the number of users connected over a proxy is much higher than the number of services. Finally, we assume the existence of an independent party without any commercial interests: a privacy protection organization T that can be offline for most of the time. We refer to all parties except users as organizations.
Security and Privacy Requirements. A secure and privacy friendly LBS protocol should protect the assets and interests of all involved parties. The assets that need to be protected are: the user's location, the user's subscription, the topic specific databases of the L j , and the payment. We consider the following requirements:
-Location privacy: The protocol does not reveal the user's location to the service. -Service usage privacy: Even when the proxy and the LBSs collude, the secrecy of the user's subscription remains protected. This includes message privacy; i.e., only the users can decrypt the messages of services. -Database secrecy: The user and the proxy get no information about the topic specific database of L j . A user gets only the information for the locations she requested. This property must hold even if the proxy and the proxy collude. -Fairness: It is guaranteed that either the user receives the expected data for the requested location and the LBS receives his expected payment, or the cheating party can be uniquely identified. In order to preserve service usage privacy, the user reveals the cheating party only to the trustee T .
Protocol phases. In the Setup phase the involved parties generate their keys. During the Service Update phase, each service L j encrypts its topic specific database and transfers it to the proxy. In the Subscription phase a user U creates an encrypted subscription for a service, sends it to the proxy, and is charged the subscription fee. In the Data Retrieval phase the proxy runs a protocol with every service L j and obtains an encrypted result. The proxy combines them into a single encrypted result for the user such that she only receives the data of the subscribed service. The fair allocation of the money collected in the subscription phase takes place in the Settlement phase under the supervision of the trustee T .
Remarks. The database of a service L j is represented as a one-dimensional vector with one element for each location. We assume that the number of locations n is the same for all services. Further, we assume that services only update the whole database at once. In the current version of our protocol a user is only subscribed to a single service. Service usage privacy is guaranteed with respect to the total number of users that subscribed during a subscription period. A subscription period is defined as the time between two settlement phases. Finally, we assume that parties communicate over secure channels and that P, L j , and T , are able to authenticate communication, and to sign messages using their identity.
High-Level Approach and First Sketch
We follow a constructive approach in the description of our protocol. We use building blocks from Sec. 2, put them into place, and describe their function in our construction. Some of the security requirements can be fulfilled by the functionality provided by individual building blocks; others require a complex interplay between building blocks. As a consequence the mapping from building blocks to the sub-protocols of our solution is not one-to-one. We will sketch the sub protocols (cf. Fig. 1 ) as they get assembled from their building blocks. Our main building blocks are two variants of OT and a threshold encryption scheme. Homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge protocols serve as sub -building blocks in the previous schemes, but are also used to glue them together in a secure way. The two OT protocols are specifically selected for their good performance under repetition of input data. The blind signature based OT scheme (cf. Sec. 2) is optimized for the case that the input database remains fixed, while the index varies. The homomorphic encryption based OT is efficient in the opposite case; it is efficient for fixed indices.
During the protocol execution, a single proxy interacts with a multitude of users and multiple services. The first building block we put into place is a blind signature based OT protocol. It is executed with the proxy acting as the requester and one of the services as the sender. It allows the proxy to retrieve location specific information mî ,j for a user at locationî without service L j learning the user's location. This guarantees location privacy. The proxy executes this subprotocol with all offered services. This assures service privacy at the service side. In this way the proxy obtains an information vector mî ,1 , . . . , mî , .
Our second building block is a homomorphic encryption based OT protocol (cf. Sec. 2). It is run with the proxy acting as the sender (using the aforementioned vector as input) and the user acting as the requester (using the index of the service L she subscribed to as input). The protocol allows the user to learn mî , without the proxy learning the user's subscription; we achieve full service privacy.
Note how the choice of OT protocols is crucial for the performance of our protocol. In the first OT, the same database is queried by the proxy for all users (and different locations as they move about). The database needs to be encrypted and transferred to the proxy only once (cf. Fig. 1.2 ). For the second OT between user and proxy, the subscribed service is invariant for the duration of a subscription period and it is sufficient to send the first (and expensive) message of the homomorphic OT only once (cf. Fig 1.3 1 ) . Consequently we split off these operations as sub-protocols which have the semantic of a service update and a user's subscription.
This gives us a first instantiation of the first 4 protocol phases. The outline of the protocol is depicted in Fig. 1 . Note that some of the sub protocols are not yet implemented. For ease of presentation we use a simplified notation. We refer the reader to App. A for a more formal definition of our LBS scheme. The detailed protocol description is given in Section 4.
Setup. (cf. Fig. 1 .1: 1 KeygenU, 2 KeygenL) Every user generates a key-pair for a homomorphic encryption scheme 1 . These keys are used for the OT based on homomorphic encryption. Every service generates a key-pair (skB, pkB) that is used for OT based on blind signatures 2 .
Service Update. (cf. Fig. 1.2: 2 EncryptData) The database of the LBS L j consists of the n elements m (1,j) , . . . , m (n,j) 1 . Each of the elements is encrypted with its own symmetric key H(k i ) that is computed by hashing the signature k i = Sign(i; skB) of the index 2 . The encrypted database DB j = (C 1 , . . . , C n ), with C i = Enc s (m i , H(k i )) is sent to the proxy 3 .
Subscription. (cf. Fig. 1 .3: 1 Subscribe) A user's subscription 1 consists of elements S (U,1) , . . . , S (U,) , . . . , S (U, ) , one for each service 2 . Each element contains a ciphertext Q of the homomorphic encryption scheme. Q decrypts to 1 for the service L the user subscribes to and to 0 otherwise. To ensure the security of the OT the user proves in zero-knowledge that all S (U,j) are correctly constructed.
Data Retrieval. (cf. Fig. 1 .4: 1 Request, 2 Combine, 4 Decrypt) In the data retrieval phase a user obtains location-specific data from her subscribed service. The proxy is involved since he is aware of the user's location and stores the encrypted databases of the services. Recall that these databases are encrypted using hashed signatures as keys. The proxy acts on the user's behalf and can request decryption of individual items without revealing the location of the user. To guarantee service usage privacy the proxy has to repeat the following steps for every service L j 1 :
The proxy blinds the locationî and sends the blinded value Blind(î; b, pkB) to the service. The service replies with the blinded signature kî blind . The proxy computes mî ,j = Dec s (Cî; H(Unblind( kî blind ; b, pkB))). This completes the first OT. The proxy collects mî ,1 , . . . , mî , and continues with the second OT (the user's first message is taken from her subscription). The proxy takes the Q corresponding to S (U,j) and computes E j = mî ,j ⊗ Q for all 1 ≤ j ≤ .This corresponds to an encryption of mî , for L and an encryption of 0 otherwise.
As a last step the proxy combines the E j by homomorphically adding all the encryptions (not knowing which of them contain the message) 2 . This way all encryptions of 0 cancel out. The result is transferred to the user 3 . She decrypts E to obtain mî , 4 .
The two main flaws of this construction are (1) the fact that the proxy learns the m i,j vector for the locations of all users. This is a compromise of database secrecy and (2) the lack of a fair payment infrastructure.
First Revision: Database Secrecy
We address the lack of database secrecy by intertwining the first OT with the second. To this end we let the proxy pass on S (U,j) to L j . Now (after agreeing on who sends which bit range) both L j and the proxy can act as senders in the second OT without learning each others inputs. This is made possible by the properties of homomorphic encryption, which lets everyone manipulate encrypted data. Informally, the last message of the first OT will be transferred as part of the encrypted payload of the second OT. This guarantees that only the user with her secret decryption key can obtain the results of both protocols.
More concretely the following changes have to be made in the subscription and data retrieval phases. Subscribe. The S (U,j) are now also sent to the services 2 .
Data Retrieval. During Request 1 the proxy blinds the locationî and sends the blinded value Blind(î; b, pkB) to the service. To ensure that only the user (and not the proxy) can decrypt Cî, the service encrypts the blinded signature kî blind . This is done with an additive homomorphic encryption scheme. Remember that during subscription the user (through the proxy) provided the service L with an encryption Q = Enc h (1). The service computes E = kî blind ⊗ Q = Enc h ( kî blind ·1) = Enc h ( kî blind ). The result is sent to the proxy who uses a similar approach to add b and Cî to E. These requests are done for all services, including those the user did not subscribe to. The latter however received Q = Enc h (0) during Subscribe and all the operations result in E j = Enc h (0), for j =.
As a last step the proxy computes the homomorphic sum of all encryptionsnot knowing which of them contain the unblinding information, the encrypted message, and the blinded signature 2 . This way all encryptions of 0 cancel out. The result is transferred to the user 3 . She decrypts E, obtains b Cî kî blind , and computes mî = Dec s (Cî; H(Unblind( kî blind ; b, pkB))) 4 .
Second Revision: Payment Infrastructure
The core idea for the payment infrastructure is to bind the request of the second OT (the subscription) to a vote. Now revenues can be fairly distributed between services by anonymously counting the number of times users voted for (subscribed to) a service. We use ballot counting techniques based on homomorphic encryption and threshold decryption. We make the following changes to the setup and subscription phase, and we provide an implementation for the settlement phase. ,1) , . . . , S (U,) , . . . , S (U, ) , one for each service 2 . Each element contains two ciphertexts Q and P of the homomorphic encryption scheme, where the first is encrypted with the user's public key and the latter with the payment key. Both Q and P decrypt to 1 for the service L the user subscribes to, and to 0 otherwise. To ensure the security of the OT and the payment, U proves in zero-knowledge that Q and P are constructed correctly. The service providers check these proofs before providing the service 3 .
Settlement. (cf. Fig. 1 .5: 1 Settlement) The technique used in the Settlement phase is similar to a technique used in electronic voting protocols. The noninteractive zero-knowledge proof sent by the user in the subscription ensures that P and Q encrypt the same value (either 1 or 0). The homomorphic property of the ciphertexts allows to anonymously sum up the content of all different P values. The trustee T ensures that only the homomorphic sums (and not individual subscriptions) are decrypted in a 3-out-of-3 threshold decryption 1 . Based on the result the proxy divides the subscription money received from the users during subscription in a fair way 2 .
Our Multi-Party Proxy LBS Scheme
Notation. We write cryptographic primitives as Alg(x; k), where x denotes the processed inputs of the algorithm and k denotes keys, randomness, or public parameters. When it is clear from the context k is omitted. We use the Alg(E 1 (x 1 ; k 1 ), E 2 (x 2 ; k 2 )) to denote an interactive algorithm between entities E 1 and E 2 with the respective inputs and keys.
Length Parameters. Let κ be a security parameter that determines the key sizes of the underlying cryptographic schemes. We use l N ∈ Θ(κ) to denote the length of the RSA modulus N used for Damgård-Jurik encryption. The length of a ciphertext for a plaintext of length N s is N s+1 . For simplicity we use ciphertexts of length l N (s + 1), to encode plaintexts of length (l N − 1)s. We use l H to denote the length of the plaintext for the homomorphic encryption scheme. Let l B , l b , and l D be the length of a blinded signature, the blinding factor, and an encrypted database entry respectively. We require
is executed for each service L j . The privacy trustee T , the proxy P and the LBS L j run a distributed key generation protocol to generate a public payment key pkS j . The secret key skS j is shared according to a (3, 3)-threshold encryption scheme such that only the three parties together can reconstruct the key. This results in three secret shares skS (Lj ,j) , skS (P,j) , and skS (T ,j) , which are included in the secret key of P, L j , and T respectively.
LBS Key Generation. Every service L j runs KeygenL(1 κ ) to generate the keypair (pk Lj , sk Lj ) that contains amongst others a key pair (pkB j , skB j ) for a unique blind signature protocol.
Proxy Key Generation. For our construction the proxy does not need to generate keys on his own. The public key pk P of P results from adding the public payment keys of the services. Hence pk P contains pkS 1 , . . . , pkS . His secret key sk P contains the corresponding secret shares skS (P,1) , . . . , skS (P, ) .
User Key Generation. KeygenU(1 κ ) generates a key pair (pk U , sk U ) for an additive homomorphic Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem [12] used for homomorphic OT [22] .
Service update. Each LBS L j encrypts its location specific information using algorithm EncryptData(m (1,j,v) , . . . , m (n,j,v) , v; sk Lj ). The value v denotes the version number of the data update. Note that m (i,j,v) contains i,j, and v and is signed by L j to allow for checks of authenticity. A service L j uses his secret key skB j to compute DB (j,v) = (C (1,j,v) , . . . , C (n,j,v) , v):
The cryptographic hash function H is used for computing the symmetric key. Note that in Sign the values i and v need to be interpreted as fixed length bit strings. The resulting database DB (j,v) is sent to the proxy.
Subscription. User U must subscribe to a service L to receive location related information from him. This is done by running the protocol Subscribe(P(sk P , pk U ), U(; sk U , pk P )) together with the proxy. The proxy's public key is parsed as pk P = (pkS 1 , . . . , pkS ) and the user proceeds as follows:
1. U uses her public key pk U to compute subscription elements S (U ,j) , 1 ≤ j ≤ :
The Q (U ,j) are used to request the location specific information from the LBS L and the P (U ,j) are used for the oblivious payment. 2. The resulting S (U ,1) , . . . , S (U , ) are sent to the proxy together with the payment for the subscription, e.g., by using a credit card. 3. Additionally, the user proves in zero-knowledge that the homomorphic sum of the values Q (U ,j) is an encryption of 1. This can be done using standard techniques from [12] . See also Sec. 2. 4. If the verification of the the last proof and of the individual π j proofs succeeds, the proxy adds a time stamp to each S (U ,j) and signs it. The proxy passes each subscription S (U ,j) on to the respective service L j . He keeps a counter of the number of user subscriptions in this subscription period. Optionally the proxy may also retain all S (U ,j) .
Verify Subscription. Service L j runs VerifySubscription(S (U ,j) , j; pk U , pk P ) to verify that S (U ,j) is correct, i.e., that the content of the queries Q (U ,j) and P (U ,j) are equal and encryptions of 0 or 1, and that the proxy cannot deny that the user has subscribed. The first is done by verifying the proofs of knowledge, the latter by verifying the proxy's time stamp and signature.
If the algorithm succeeds, S (U ,j) is added to a list of subscriptions S j . The P (U ,j) of S j will later on be added up using the homomorphic property of the underlying encryption scheme Enc h . If one of the verifications done by the services L j , 1 ≤ j ≤ fails, they refuse to provide the information and the proxy has to refund the payment for the subscription to the user.
Data retrieval. The proxy runs Request(P(DB (j,v) ,î; sk P , pk Lj ), L j (S (U ,j) ; sk Lj , pk U , pk P )) with L j to request location specific information for user U.
The input of the algorithm is the database DB (j,v) with most up-to-date versionv and the current location of the userî. The proxy's output is either an encryption of m (î,j,v) based on the location of the user or an encryption of 0 if U is not subscribed to L j . The random blinding factor b hides the locationî of the user in î v blind . 2. The proxy sends î v blind to L j , 1 ≤ j ≤ , which computes
, where kî ,j,v blind = Sign( î v blind ; skB j ) 3. Every service L j sends E j back to the proxy. 4. The proxy enriches E j with C (î,j,v) and b. This is done by computing
Where denotes shifting to the left. This only changes the content of E j if Q (U ,j) is an encryption of 1.
Combining. After running Request with every L j and receiving the corresponding E j , the proxy runs Combine(E 1 , . . . , E l , sk P , pk U ) to compute E = j=1 E j .
Decrypting. The user decrypts E using Decrypt(E; sk U , pk L ):
Settlement. The proxy P can share the money collected during subscription fairly by counting the number of users that subscribed to service L j in a given subscription period. However, this has to be done without revealing the user's service usage. First, L j transfers S j to the proxy and the privacy trustee. P and T check the signature and the time stamp of each S (U ,j) to make sure that L j does not add self generated subscriptions. Moreover, the proxy checks if |S j | corresponds to his subscription counter. This is needed to guarantee that services do not try to shrink the anonymity set of users. As the trustee is not online all the time he can only check the plausibility of the value. However, privacy savvy users can submit their encrypted subscriptions (or its hash) to the privacy trustee, which checks if their descriptions are considered during settlement.
The computation of L j 's fraction of the money is jointly done by the proxy, the privacy trustee and the service L j . First, they compute U P (U ,j) . The result is an encryption of the number of users having subscribed to service L j . Since U P (U ,j) is encrypted with pkS j , all three parties have to participate in a distributed (3, 3)-threshold decryption. The output of Settlement(L j (S j ; sk Lj , pk P ), P(sk P , pk Lj ), T (sk Sj ,T )) is the total number of users subscribed to service L j . As long as not all parties collude, the service usage privacy of the users is guaranteed. See Section 5.2 for details.
Security and Efficiency

Efficiency analysis
For our efficiency analysis we focus on two main factors. The first is the limitation in computation and communication resources on small mobile devices. The other factor is scalability for the organizations with respect to location resolution, i.e. number n of map cells, number of services , and number of users. The costs for the setup of the payment and the service and proxy key generation are independent of the number of users and map cells. They are executed by unrestricted parties, and are thus ignored in the analysis. A similar argument holds for the settlement. We consider only public-key operations and use the length parameters from Section 4.
User. The costs incurred by the user are key generation, subscription, and decryption. Computation: Key generation involves the generation of a single RSA key. The decryption requires a single Damgård-Jurik decryption. The most relevant cost for the user is the generation of the subscriptions with 12 exponentiations. However, this cost is incurred only once per subscription period. In principle, the computed values can even be reused for multiple periods. Communication: A Damgård-Jurik ciphertext size is about l H + l N , where l N is the size of the RSA modulus. The overhead in addition to the message length l D is l B + l b + l N . If we use RSA blind signatures, this is three times the size of an RSA modulus. The size of a subscription is about 12 (l H + l N ). For small devices and slow communication channels, we suggest to do the key generation and subscription over the user's PC, and synchronize sk U to the user's mobile device, or create the keys on the device, and move only pk U to the PC for added security.
Organizations. The scalability of our service is nearly optimal. Key setup and database encryption are independent of the number of users. Database encryption is linear in the number of locations. Subscriptions are linear in the number of services-optimal as all services need to be involved to guarantee service privacy. Practically data transfer is independent of the number of locations and again only depends on the number of services. 
Computation:
The most prominent cost incurred by the service is database encryption requiring one signature operation per location. Communication: The most dominant cost for L j and P is the transmission of the encrypted database DB (j,v) which has length n · l D . Moreover, this costs incur whenever any of the m i should be updated. This is a consequence of our strong database security definition. For a wide range of services it appears reasonable to relax this requirements. Updated encryptions C i are computed like in EncryptData but only for a subset U ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of updated locations.
Security Analysis
Our main goal is to implement LBSs without revealing additional information about the user's location and her service usage profiles. An adversary involved in our protocol should learn nothing except what he already could have learned by being involved in a scenario without LBSs. For the proxy this implies that he is allowed to know the user's location but should not learn anything about the user's service usage profiles. For service providers this implies that both the user's location and the user's service usage profiles have to be concealed. Note that in a scenario that includes payment mechanisms we have to diminish slightly from this strong security notion of no additional knowledge since a service can infer the number of subscribed users from the received amount of money.
As a further trust assumption we state that the proxy helps to solve fairness conflicts between users and service providers. This trust assumption is supported by the rationality of the proxy: his core competence is setting up the mobile infrastructure such that services and users can communicate in a fair way. Cheating or not cooperating in resolving fairness disputes decreases his reputation, thus decreasing his profit. Only in cases where accusing the cheater would endanger the users service privacy, we make use of the privacy trustee as an additional off-line trusted party. The assumption of a trusted third party to resolve fairness problems is common in the literature of fair exchange protocols. [2, 3] have shown that the problem of fairly exchanging data requires at least an off-line trusted party.
Location privacy. For the location privacy note first that in our protocol services only get in contact with location related information in the data retrieval phase. However, there the OT based on blind signatures protects location related information from being revealed unintentionally. The security of the OT scheme is based on the signature's blindness property. This property guarantees that for any malicious service L j the view of L j for a messages M 0 = i v and for a message M 1 = i v is computationally indistinguishable. As the user's location ı is hidden in î v blind , the location privacy can be reduced to the blindness property of the used blind signature scheme.
Service usage privacy. is more challenging. Unfortunately, achieving service usage privacy First, the relationship user/service plays a role in different protocol stages; i.e. it is present during data retrieval and in the payment processes. Second, we consider a stronger, but realistic, adversary model and allow for a corrupted proxy, who possibly collaborates with any service. This implies that the service usage privacy cannot rely on the help of the proxy. We proceed by analyzing the relevant phases.
In the subscription phase, the user's subscription together with the proof of knowledge could reveal the user's service usage. In case of the first the crucial information is protected by the semantic security of the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme. The semantic security guarantees that two different subscriptions are indistinguishable. The zero-knowledge property of π j ensures that no further information is revealed.
During the settlement, privacy is protected by using a joint decryption technique, i.e. a ciphertext can only be decrypted if the three parties, the P, L j , and T work together. Hence, even if P and L j are corrupted, there is no way for the adversary to force the decryption of a single subscription that would reveal the user/service relationship. This is only true as long as it is not possible to present faked subscriptions to the privacy trustee, which later on get accepted. This would reduce the size of the anonymity set |S j |. The faked subscription attack reduces to n − 1-attack [9] , against which a full protection is impossible. However, to make it more difficult for an adversary, it could be mandatory for users to always submit a subscription (or hash of it) to the trustee. This technique leads to a lower bound for the size of the anonymity set |S j |. To some extent the sensitivity to these attacks can be reduced by using authenticated channels such that subscriptions can be assigned to real users.
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Although one cannot assume the honesty of the proxy in general, it often seems more realistic to limit the adversaries' power to corrupt only services. This is further supported by our assumption of the proxy's rationality. In the case of the proxy's honesty, we have a stronger protection against the faking attack: first, because the proxy and the trustee verify the correctness of the signature and the time stamp and second, because the proxy checks for the equality of |S j | and his subscription counter. Both techniques help to protect against attempts in shrinking the anonymity set.
Database secrecy. In contrast to location and service usage privacy the database secrecy protects the interest of the LBS. It guarantees that a user gets no more than the requested information even if she collaborates with the proxy. The database secrecy of our scheme, relies on two aspects: First, the service encrypts his database before he sends it to the proxy. Second, as a result of the data retrieval phase the user only gets to know the requested data. This is due to the so called 'Database security' [21] of the underlying secure OT protocol.
Fairness. Our system is said to be fair if both the interests of the user and of the service are equally protected. With respect to our protocol this means that neither the user gets access to content without paying nor the service is able to cheat and receive a non-authorized payment without providing the information.
The fairness of our protocol significantly relies on the rationality and the consequential semi-honesty of the proxy. Furthermore we require a trade off between service privacy and fairness to protect against active attacks by services.
User fairness. From the user's perspective fairness is accomplished when the user receives the appropriate location information for her payment.
The proxy sends a request to each service. The service responds with a signed value E j that is either an encryption of 0 (if the user did not subscribe to L j ) or an encryption of the requested data. Should a service fail to provide any value E j , the proxy forces it to pay a fee corresponding to the price of a service subscription and passes that money on to the affected user. Now the proxy computes the user's final value E by combining all responses. The user decrypts E and checks whether it corresponds with her requested data. To facilitate this, the messages m (î,,v) containî,, andv and is signed by L j . If a message is incorrect, the user can file a complaint.
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In this case the user has three choices: she can either choose full privacy and give up her money; she can file the complaint with the privacy trustee; or she can complain directly with the proxy. Complaints contain a proof of correct decryption of a signed E. The recipient of the complaint verifies the proof and pays the money back. T will ask the proxy for the money given to users during conflict resolution in return for a list of bad services. These services will receive reduced payment or be sanctioned otherwise. Should the proxy refuse to pay the money to the trustee this can only be resolved legally.
Our protocol does not protect against denial of service attacks in which malicious services send random ciphertexts instead of k (î,j,v) blind ⊗ Q j . However, this can be detected if users are willing to give up their privacy towards the proxy. We again rely on an optimistic strategy and the punishment of attackers upon detection. It is an open problem to propose an efficient data retrieval protocol based on zero-knowledge protocols that solves this problem.
Service fairness. means that service providers receive fair payment. In particular, a service provider must receive money for every user he serves. This is ensured by the checks done in VerifySubscription. The algorithm checks that Q (U ,j) and P (U ,j) encode the same value v ∈ {0, 1}. We refer to P (U ,j) as the vote. Obviously if v = 0, no service is provided. Consider the case of v = 1: if (1) all votes are considered and (2) the votes are counted correctly, P (U ,j) increases the subscription counter of L j by 1. The first is ensured by the time stamp and signature of the proxy. The second property relies on the security of the homomorphic encryption scheme and the security of the distributed decryption against active adversaries.
